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INTRODUCTION

Real property foreclosures and the Bankruptcy Code make strange
bedfellows. Despite 400 years of relatively peaceful coexistence between
insolvency law and foreclosure law, the last two decades have witnessed the
emergence of a tumultuous relationship.' The constant ebb and flow of each
body of law has resulted in uncertainty regarding the bankruptcy impact on real
property foreclosures.
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corp.,2 circuit courts disagreed on whether a real property foreclosure
constituted a fraudulent transfer.' This divisiveness may be traced to the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Durrettv. WashingtonNationalInsuranceCo. 4 InDurrett
the Fifth Circuit held that a bid price less than seventy percent of the property's
fair market value subjected the foreclosure sale to avoidance under § 548(a)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code.- InBFPthe Supreme Court rejected the Durrettrule
and held that the consideration received at a noncollusive, regularly conducted
real estate foreclosure sale constituted a "reasonably equivalent value" under
§ 548(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code as a matter of law.6
Despite the Court's pronouncement that a regularly conducted real

1. See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (resolving a split in

the appellate courts over whether real property foreclosures constitute fraudulent transfers).
2. Id.

3. See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988); Lawyers Title
Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds,
725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.. 1984); Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.

1980).
4. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co.,
647 F.2d 547, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1981) (following Durrett in examining a foreclpsure sale as a
possible fraudulent transfer).
5. 621 F.2d at 202-03.

6. BFP,511 U.S. at 545. But cf Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift FromPowerto Process:
A FunctionalApproach to ForeclosureLaw, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 92-95 (1996) (noting that
because foreclosuresales do notproduce competitive bidding, the sale often results in inadequate
sale proceeds).
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property foreclosure does not constitute a fraudulent transfer,7 an uneasy
coexistence between the Bankruptcy Code and real property foreclosures
continues. Specifically, BFP did not address the argument that unreasonable

creditor bid-ins at a foreclosure sale may constitute a voidable preference under
§ 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.8 This Article confronts this troubling issue and
discusses whether the Supreme Court's reasoning inBFPprecludes relief under
§ 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. After dispatching the Court's specious
reasoning in BFP, this Article isolates the actual reasoning behind the
holding-protection of good title to real estate from a potential fraudulent
transfer cloud. The Article then shows that the Court's fear regarding any
bankruptcy cloud on title was unfounded-buyers of real estate and title
insurance companies had adjusted quite well to the Durrettrule.
The BFPCourt's rejection of the Durrett rule deprived bankruptcy trustees
of a potent mechanism to recover certain transfers of value for the estate to be

7. Although no longer subject to traditional fraudulent transfer attack under § 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee may still challenge sales under an array of vehicles. See Debra
Pogrund Stark, The EmperorStill Has Clothes: FraudulentConveyance ChallengesAfter the
BFP Decision, 47 S.C. L. REV. 563 (1996).
8. Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code reads as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,
the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt
owed by the debtor before such transfer
was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before
the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between ninety days and
one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, if such
creditor at the time of such
transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive
more than such creditor would receive if(A) the case were a case under
chapter 7 of this tifle
(3) the transfer had not been
made; and
(C) such creditor received
payment of such debt to the
extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
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distributed among all the debtor's creditors.9 Prior to Durrett, there were a
sprinkling of decisions in which real property foreclosures were avoided on the
basis of preferential transfer law.'" One would expect that the rejection of
Durrettwould increase the use of § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code to challenge
real property foreclosures as preferential transfers. However, an empirical
examination of the real property foreclosure cases decided after BFPreveals
only a few attacks on real property foreclosures based on § 547.I This Article
examines the implications of these results. At bottom, this Article recognizes
that conventional wisdom strongly suggests that a foreclosure sale is not
subject to an avoidance action under § 547. Nonetheless, conventional wisdom
gets it wrong. Compelling policy reasons and the actual language of § 547 join
in condemning unreasonable creditor bid-ins.
Part I of this Article introduces the difficult issues posed by the application
of fraudulent transfer law to real property foreclosures. In order to provide a
proper backdrop to the issues posed by unreasonable creditor bid-ins at real
property foreclosure sales, the Article examines the law on constructive
fraudulent transfers 12 up to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in BFP.Part
I concludes with an examination of the historic role of fraudulent transfer law
and the application of § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code in the context of real
property foreclosures. 3
Part II sets forth the elements of an avoidable preference under § 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code as those elements relate to creditor bid-ins. Part II concludes
with a discussion centered on the conceptual interface between §§ 548 and 547
in the context of real property foreclosures.
Part III of this Article begins with a discussion of the problems and
anomalies that arise in applying provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to real
property foreclosures. Part III provides several permutations of the creditor bidin scenario to set the stage for a preference attack. Part III also pushes the
traditional legal models in an attempt to expose inconsistencies and
weaknesses.
Part IV confronts the application of avoidable preference law to

9. See id. §§ 550, 551 (granting the trustee the power to recover fraudulently
transferred property); see also id. § 1107 (granting the debtor-in-possession most of the same
powers allowed to the trustee).
10. See Winters v. First Union Nat'l Bank (In re Winters), 119 B.R. 283,285 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990); Park North Partners, Ltd. v. Park North Assocs. (In re Park North Partners,
Ltd.), 85 B.R. 916, 918-19 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler
(In re Wheeler), 34 B.R. 818, 820-22 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983).
11. See Cottrell v. United States (In re Cottrell), 213 B.R. 33, 43-44 (Bankr. M.D.
Ala. 1997) (rejecting § 547(b) challenge where mortgagee acquired home at foreclosure for a bid
amount that was 64.7% of the value alleged by debtor/mortgagor); O'Neill v. Dell (In re
O'Neill), 204 B.R. 881, 891-93 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) (rejecting 547(b) challenge of foreclosure
sale to third party.)
12. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A).
13. For an analysis of the historic role of fraudulent transfers, see Jack F. Williams,
Revisiting the ProperLimits of FraudulentTransferLaw, 8 BANKR. DEvs. J. 55 (1991).
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foreclosures. It begins with a critical examination of present authorities,
seeking to isolate several common themes embraced in both upholding and
condemning real property foreclosures under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.
It addresses the nuances and reasons why the interface of bankruptcy law and
foreclosure law is so troubling. Furthermore, Part IV constructs a model of
§§ 548 and 547 as applied to real property foreclosures that is rooted in
tradition and in the language of the relevant provisions. Part IV concludes that
the language of § 547(b)(5) strongly supports cases holding that unreasonable
creditorbid-ins may constitute avoidable preferences. Nonetheless, the concern
of the Court in BFP with the protection of good title in real property
foreclosures may ultimately edge out the policy historically embodied in
fraudulent transfer law of capturing value for the benefit of creditors.
Consequently, it appears that the neglect ofpreference attacks on unreasonable
creditor bid-ins uncovered by the empirical work reported in this Article may
be nothing more than the trustees' interpretation of the Supreme Court's view
on the subject.
II. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW AS APPLIED TO REAL PROPERTY
FORECLOSURES

Modem real property foreclosure law has been developed with several
objectives in mind. Initially, the foreclosure sale was designed to produce an
effective means of transferring title to real property from the defaulted debtor
to the secured creditor. 4 This procedure theoretically keeps financing costs
lower, increases the availability of funds forborrowers, andpreserves good title
to real property."
Modem fraudulent transfer law, as incorporated in the Bankruptcy Code,
developed from the English law of fraudulent conveyances dating back to a
1570 statute enacted by the Parliament of Queen Elizabeth 1.16 The purpose of
fraudulent transfer (or conveyance) law was "to prevent the debtor from taking
deliberate action to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors."' 7 However,
American adaptation of this law in the Bankruptcy Code extended its reach "to
cases where the objective result of the transaction is detrimental to creditors,
whether or not the debtor actually intended such detriment.""' The statute was
passed for the protection of creditors and gave them, among other things, the
power to avoid conveyances and transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors. The American codification of this bankruptcy law was set
14. Mattingly, supra note 6, at 91 & n.66.
15. Id. at 80.
16. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

67.29[1 ], at 471 (James Wm. Moore et al. eds.,

14th ed. 1975); 4 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1638, at 110 (1957).
17. Stephen M. Alden et al., Real PropertyForeclosureas a FraudulentConveyance:

Proposalsfor Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. LAW. 1605, 1605 (1983).
18. Id. at 1605-06.
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forth in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898."' A review of section 67(e) of the 1898
Act demonstrates that it dealt only with conveyances made with actual intent
to defraud.20 The 1938 Act expanded the law of'fraudulent conveyances by
creating constructive fraudulent conveyances. 2 This expansion permitted the
setting aside of conveyances made by a debtor without fair consideration,
regardless of the debtor's actual intent.2"
Historically, real property foreclosures and fraudulent transfer law were
like two ships passing in the night. These venerable bodies of law developed
without much overlap or consideration of each other's rationales. Therefore, it
is not surprising that when the two bodies of law did meet, the collision
produced considerable turbulence. The tension points between fraudulent
transfer law and real property foreclosures are outlined below.
A. FraudulentTransferLaw: Introduction
Sections 548(a) and 544(b) (which incorporate state fraudulent transfer
law) of the Bankruptcy Code recognize the power of a trustee to challenge
transfers made as fraudulent. 23 Section 548(a) provides:
(a)

19.
20.
21.
22.

The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of
the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by
the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within
one year before the date of the filing of the petition,
if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily(1)
made such transfer or incurred such
obligation with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity to which the
debtor was or became, on or after the date
that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(2) (A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and
(B) (i)
was insolvent on the date that such transfer
was made or such obligation was incurred,
or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation;

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1938).
Id. at Stat. 564-65.
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67d(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (repealed 1978).
Id. § 67d(2)(a)-(c). The Chandler Act of 1938 replaced § 67e of the 1898 Act with

§ 67d.
23. Pursuant to § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee can avoid any transfer
made by the debtor that an unsecured creditor with an allowable claim could avoid under state
fraudulent transfer law. See, e.g., In re Massey, 225 B.R. 887, 890 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998);
Williams, supra note 13, at 57.
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(ii)

was

engaged in business

or a

transaction, or was about to engage in

(iii)

business or a transaction, for which any
property remaining with the debtor was
an unreasonably small capital; or
intended to incur, or believed that the
debtor would incur, debts that would be
beyond the debtor's ability to pay as
such debts matured.2 a

Section 548 gives a trustee the power to avoid fraudulent transfers done
with either actual or constructive fraudulent intent. The fraudulent transfer is
a limitation on the creditor's right to realize upon the available assets of its
debtor: "The law imposes a substantive prohibition-the debtor may not
dispose of its property with the intent, actual or implied by law, of placing the
property beyond the reach of its creditors."'
Although most authorities agree that one of the fundamental thrusts of
fraudulent transfer law is to preserve the value of the debtor's estate for the
benefit of creditors, authorities disagree about where the proper limits of
fraudulent transfer law should be drawn.26
To make out a successful § 548(a)(2) claim, a trustee must prove the
following elements: (1) a transfer27 to the defendant of (2) an interest in

property of the debtor2" (3) during the year preceding the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy2 9 (4) without reasonably equivalent value30 in exchange for such
24. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994).
25. Williams, supra note 13, at 58-59.
26. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, FraudulentConveyance Law
andIts ProperDomain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829, 835 (1985); David Gray Carlson, Is Fraudulent
Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 643, 645 (1987); Frank R. Kennedy, The
Uniform FraudulentTransferAct, 18 UCC L.J. 195 (1986); Paul M. Shupack, Confusion in
Policy and Languagein the Uniform FraudulentTransferAct, 9 CARDOzO L. REv. 811 (1987);
Williams, supra note 13, at 59; Jack F. Williams, The Fallaciesof ContemporaryFraudulent
TransferModels as Applied to IntercorporateGuaranties:FraudulentTransferLaw as a Fuzzy
System, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1403, 1457-62 (1994).
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (defining the word "transfer"); see also infra Part I.A.1.
28. "Interest of the debtor in property" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Though
this is a question of federal law, the courts will consult state law in determining whether this
element is satisfied. IA Bankr. Service, Laws. Edition (West Publ'g Co.) § 5D: 12, at 19 & n. I
(1990). The property requirement enjoys a broad scope and is generally construed in light of the
purposes of fraudulent transfer law. Generally, the transfer must have depleted the debtor's
estate. Id. § 5D:12, at 19-20 & n.2.
29. The date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy is the timing reference under
§ 548. See Emerson v. Maples (In re Benskin & Co.), 161 B.R. 644, 650-51 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1993); Bluford v. First Fidelity Mortgage Co. (In re Bluford), 40 B.R. 640, 644 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1984).
30. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 used the phrase "fair consideration." It included a
requirement of good faith that no longer exists under § 548(a)(2) or §§ 4 and 5 of the UFTA. See
Carr v. DeMusis (In re Carr), 34 B.R. 653, 656 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983).
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transfer (5) while the debtor was insolvent.3 Two elements-the timing of the
transfer and the presence of reasonably equivalent value-are directly at play
in the real property foreclosure context.
1. Definition of "Transfer"
Transfer is broadly defined in § 101 (54) of the Bankruptcy Code to include
"every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in
property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the
debtor's equity of redemption."32 However, the section does not fix the time a
transfer takes place; rather, the time when a transfer is deemed made for
purposes of fraudulent transfer actions depends on § 548(d)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law. Section 548(d)(1) states:
For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such
transfer is so perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the
debtor against whom applicable law permits such transfer to
be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the property
transferred that is superior to the interest in such property of
the transferee, but if such transfer is not so perfected before
the commencement of the case, such transfer is made
immediately before the date of the filing of the petition. 3"
Consequently, under § 548 the fraudulent transfer is deemed to have
occurred when the transfer became valid against a subsequent bona fide
purchaser pursuant to applicable state law.34 In the event the transfer is not
perfected against a bona fide purchaser before the filing of the petition, the
transfer is deemed to have occurred immediately before the date of the filing.35
Section 548(d)(1) serves two purposes: first, it establishes the time of
perfection as an objective point in computing the reach-back period of the
trustee, and second, it discourages secret, unperfected liens.36
The following example shows several stages in the typical real estate
31. See, e.g., Murphy v. General Elec. Credit (In reDuque Rodriguez), 77 B.R. 939,
940 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987).
32. II U.S.C. § 101(54).
33. Id. § 548(d)(1).
34. See Sandoz v. Bennett (In re Emerald Oil Co.), 807 F.2d 1234, 1237 (5th Cir.
1987); Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1984);
Gennet v. Docktor (In re Levy), 185 B.R. 378, 382 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995).
35. See, e.g., Brown v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Brown), 104 B.R. 609, 613
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); Schatzman v. Campo (In re Oesterle), 2 B.R. 122, 124 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1979).
36. See Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1200; Nemeti v. Seaway Nat'l Bank (In re Nemeti), 65
B.R. 391, 395 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986); see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 548.01-04
(Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1996) (providing an overview of§ 548).
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finance scenario where a transfer may occur for fraudulent transfer purposes.
Assume A seeks financing to purchase an office complex in Dallas, Texas.
Bank B is willing to make the loan only on a secured basis. A borrows eighty
percent of the purchase price from Bank B and grants Bank B a lien in the
property pursuant to a deed of trust to secure repayment. At this point two
significant legal events have occurred. First, A has incurred an obligation to
Bank B to repay the borrowed amount. This obligation is not fraudulent under
§ 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code because A directly benefits from the
borrowed finds. 3 Second, A transferred an interest in the real property to Bank
B by granting a lien. The transfer is deemed made under § 548(d) when the
deed of trust is recorded in the real property records of Dallas County, Texas.
This transfer is for a "reasonably equivalent value" provided by Bank B.3"
Some time laterA defaults on the obligation, and Bank B forecloses on the
property in accordance with Texas real property law. Shortly thereafter, Bank
B prepares and files a trustee's deed of sale. Is the foreclosure of the lien a
transfer under § 548(a)? To be sure, a foreclosure sale extinguishes A's right
of redemption. But is that enough? Courts disagree.
For example, in its determination of whether the "transfer" had occurred
within the requisite time period of § 548, the Durrettcourt found that there
were actually two transfers: the first occurring when a lien in the property was
granted, and the second when the foreclosure sale itself was held.39 Recall that
a transfer must occur within one year of the filing of the petition to be subject
to a fraudulent transfer attack. This second transfer, which foreclosed the
debtor's equitable right of redemption," was the transfer at issue in the court's41
opinion and clearly occurred within the limited reach-back period of § 548.
The comprehensive character of this definition [of
"transfer"] leads us to conclude that the transfer of title to the
real property of the debtor in possession pursuant to an
arrangement under Chapter XI of the [Bankruptcy] Act, by a
trustee on foreclosure of a deed of trust, to a purchaser at the
sale constitutes a "transfer" by debtor in possession within the
purview of § 67(d).42 The actual transfer of title was made by
Durrett to Fields, as trustee, via the deed of trust, executed
April 7, 1969, to secure an indebtedness then owing to

37. Section 548(a)(2) encompasses both fraudulent transfers made and fraudulent
obligations incurred. See Williams, supra note 26, at 1410-11.
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A).
39. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980).
40. Equitable right of redemption refers to the mortgagor's right to pay the debt
secured by the mortgage, after default under the mortgage, and any time prior to foreclosure. See
GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.1, at 478-79 (2d ed.

1985).

41. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 204.
42. Section 548(d) is the current version of § 67d.
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Southern and thereafter assigned to Washington. Possession
of the property was retained by Durrett subject to the power
of the trustee to sell and deliver possession of the property, on
default, at a foreclosure sale. While the actual conveyance of
title by Durrett was made on April 7, 1969, possession was
retained until foreclosure of the deed of trust. The "transfer"
within the contemplation of the Act, was not final until the
day of the foreclosure sale, January 4, 1977. 4
In contrast, in Madridv. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. (In re Madrid)44
the Ninth Circuit held that a real property foreclosure is not a transfer under
§ 548."' The court found that the foreclosure sale must be upheld because the
transfer of the home occurred at the time of perfection of the trust deed, not
upon foreclosure.' Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that the use of § 548 to set
aside properly conducted foreclosure sales was simply inappropriate. 47 This
would be the case even where the debtor acted with the intent "to hinder, delay,
or defraud" its creditors.48
Consistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Madridis the bankruptcy
court's decision in Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop).49 In Alsop the court held that
the Fifth Circuit in Durrettmisapplied the time frame of § 548.50 The Alsop
court reasoned that the "transfer" in question occurred when the deed of trust
was recorded and not when the foreclosure sale, which merely enforced an
interest previously conveyed, occurred.-" Because the lien in Alsop had been
granted prior to the reach-back period of one year found in § 548, the "transfer"
could not be challenged or set aside as a constructive fraudulent transfer."
Subsequent toAlsop andMadrid,Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code
through the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984."3
The term "transfer" was amended specifically to include "foreclosure of the
debtor's equity of redemption."'54 With this amendment, Congress clearly
intended to encompass a real property foreclosure in the Bankruptcy Code's

43. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 204.
44. 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984).
45. Id. at 1201-02.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1200-01.
Id. at 1201.
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1994).
22 B.R. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
Id. at 1018.

51. Id.
52. Id.

53. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 421(i), 98 Stat. 333, 338 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1994)).

54. The present definition of "transfer" reads "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute
or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an
interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the
debtor's equity of redemption." II U.S.C. § 101(54).
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5
definition of transfer, thus rejecting the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Madrid."
However, after passage of the amendments, key senatorial sponsors made
statements that the amendment was "not intended to have any effect one way
or the other on the so called Durrettissue. '' 6 Consequently, courts were left to
grapple only with what was meant by this statement57 and whether it referred
to the issue of timing of the transfer or to the issue of reasonably equivalent
value. 8
Subsequent to the amendment of the definition of "transfer," the Ninth
Circuit addressed the issue again. In its decision in Ehring v. Western
CommunityMoneycenter (In reEhring),s9 theNinth Circuit disposed of its own
theory, first set forth in Madrid,that a foreclosure sale is not itself a transfer."0
Recognizing that a foreclosure sale extinguishes rights of a debtor while
increasing rights of a buyer, the court, noting the 1984 amendments, ended the
tenure of Madridand held that the sale itself may constitute a transfer.

2. Failureof "'ReasonablyEquivalent Value"
A constructive fraudulent transfer requires that the debtor receive less than
a reasonably equivalent value for the transfer.6 2 The determination of what
constitutes reasonably equivalent value is an objective one and is generally a

55. Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (9th
Cir. 1984).
56. 130 CONG. REC. 30,648-49 (1984) (dialogue between Sen. DeConcini and Sen.
Dole).
57. Post-enactment statements of legislators are generally accorded little, if any,
deference. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982) ("Such post hoc statements of a
congressional Committee are not entitled to much weight."); Nevada Employees' Ass'n v. Bryan,
916 F.2d 1384,1389 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[P]ost-enactment letters from Congress are afforded little
deference.") (citing Weinberger,456 U.S. at 35).
58. Apparently, it was initially proposed that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to
deal with the Durrettissue specifically, and Senator Thurmond supported amendments to remove
all doubt that § 548 applied to foreclosure sales. This removal would be accomplished by
amending both the definition of"transfer" and the scope of fraudulent transfers to include both
voluntary and involuntary transfers. However, a third part of the amendments associated with
the Durrettissue would have provided a form of safe-harbor, and a creditor that bid-in the full
amount at a regularly conducted and non-collusive foreclosure sale would, by definition, have
given "reasonably equivalent value." In order to obtain expedited debate, Senator Thurmond
agreed to drop all amendments pertaining to the Durrettissue; however, only the provision
pertaining to the safe-harbor provision was dropped, and the remaining Durrett amendments
were inadvertently left intact. See Vern Countryman, The Concept OfA Voidable PreferenceIn
Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 743 n.168 (1985).

59.
60.
61.
62.

900 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 187-89.
Id. at 187-88.
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994).
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question of fact.63 According to this approach,
Reasonably equivalent value is not susceptible to simple
formulation. Ideally, it should signify the reasonable estimate
of what can be realized from the debtor's assets by converting
them into cash under possibly guarded (but not forced-sale)
conditions. The focus is on the consideration received by the
debtor, not on the value given by the transferee. The purpose
of fraudulent transfer law is the preservation of the debtor's
estate for the benefit of its unsecured creditors. Consequently,
what constitutes reasonably equivalent value must be
6
determined from the standpoint of the debtor's creditors.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, "value" is defined as "property, or
satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does
not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a
' 65
relative of the debtor.
B. The Origin of ConstructiveFraudulentTransfer Challenges
InDurrettv.WashingtonNationalInsuranceCo.66 the Fifth Circuit voided
a prepetition real property foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer under
§ 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, the court suggested, in
dicta, that any foreclosure and transfer of a debtor's interest in the real property
for a bid price less than seventy percent of the property's fair value presumably
constituted a lack of reasonably equivalent value. 61 This permitted the
bankruptcy estate in Durrettto recover the property and capture the equity for
the benefit of creditors. 69
Durrettinvolved a prepetition foreclosure in which the property, having a
fair market value of $200,000, was sold to a third-party purchaser for the exact

63. See Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing McNellis
v. Raymond, 287 F. Supp. 232, 238 (N.D.N.Y. 1968)); Jacoway v. Anderson (In re Ozark
Restaurant Equip. Co.), 74 B.R. 139, 143 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part,77 B.R. 686 (W.D. Ark. 1987), aff'd in partandrev'dinpart,850 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1988).
But see BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531,545 (1994) (finding bid price constitutes
reasonably equivalent value in noncollusive, nonjudicial foreclosure sale); Durrettv. Washington
Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201,203 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing that the determination of reasonably
equivalent value is a question of law in the mortgage foreclosure context).
64. Williams, supra note 13, at 80 (footnotes omitted).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A).
66. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 204.
68. Id. at 203.
69. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 551 ("Any transfer avoided under section... 548... of
this title. . . is preserved for the benefit of the estate but only with respect to the property of the
estate.").
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amount of the outstanding indebtedness secured by the property, $115,400.70
Nine days after the foreclosure sale, the debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy
seeking to have the transfer set aside as a constructive fraudulent transfer.7 The
debtor contended that the bid price of approximately fifty-seven percent of the
fair market value of the property did not constitute a reasonably equivalent
value.72 Having determined when the transfer occurred,73 the court focused on

the amount received and determined that the bid amount was insufficient to
constitute a reasonably equivalent value.74 The court explained, "Here, Mitchell

paid slightly more than 50 percent (57.7%) for the property involved. The sale,
however, deprived the bankruptcy estate of an equity in the property of
$84,600.00,
if computed on the $200,000.00 market value fixed by the district
75
court.

Subsequent cases and the bankruptcy bar practice interpreted the court's
dicta as suggesting that anything less than seventy percent of the fair market
value of the property would fail to meet the "fair equivalent" standard under the
then existing statute.76 The court emphasized:

We have been unable to locate a decision of any district or
appellate court dealing only with a transfer of real property as
the subject of attack under § 67(d) of the Act, which has
approved the transfer for less than 70 percent of the market
value of the property.77
The seventy percent bid rule quickly became the benchmark by which the Fifth
Circuit, and to a large extent, other courts began to assess real property
foreclosure sales.78
The Durrettdecision set off a firestorm of debate as to whether the holding
was a proper use of § 548.79Nonetheless, trustees commonly challenged real

70. 621 F.2d at 203.
71. Id. at 202; see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2).
72. 621 F.2d at 203.
73. Id. at 204.
74. Id. at 203-04.
75. Id. at 203.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Berge v. Sweet (In re Berge), 33 B.R. 642, 649 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1983); Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co. (In rePerdido Bay Country
Club Estates, Inc.), 23 B.R. 36, 39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones (In re
Jones), 20 B.R. 988, 993-94 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re
Thompson), 18 B.R. 67,70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
79. See, e.g., Timothy J. Boyce, The Supreme Court and the Death of Durrett, 23
REAL EST. L.J. 205 (1995); Jeremy Galton, Durrett Resolved, 112 BANKING L.J. 270 (1995);
William H. Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and PersonalProperty
Foreclosures: Some ProposedModifications,63 N.C. L. REv. 257 (1985); Frank R. Kennedy,
hIvoluntaryFraudulentTransfers, 9 CAnDozo L. REv. 531 (1987); John P. Roberts & Stephen
J. Moriarty, Mortgage ForeclosureSales as FraudulentConveyances: The Durrett Issue, 10
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property foreclosures as constructive fraudulent transfers. Other cases followed
in which the Durrett holding was adopted, both in the Fifth Circuit and
beyond.8"
However, the Durrettrule was not universally accepted, and a split among
the circuits ultimately developed."' One ofthe better known decisions rejecting
Durrettis Madridv. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. (In re Madrid).8" In fact,
Madrid was the impetus for two divergent models of fraudulent transfer
law---one model
from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and another from the
3
Ninth Circuit.
InMadrid4the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded
that a nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust would not be set aside as a
fraudulent transfer, even though the foreclosure price was significantly less
than the fair market value of the property." The court held that the
consideration received at a noncollusive, regularly conducted public sale
satisfies the "reasonably equivalent value" requirement of § 548(a)(2).86
Madridinvolved the purchase of real property at a foreclosure sale by an
unrelated third party for a price of approximately sixty-four to sixty-seven
percent of the property's market value at the time of sale.87 Finding that the bid
price was less than seventy percent of the fair market value of the property, the
bankruptcy court voided the sale and ordered the property returned to the
bankruptcy estate in accordance with the Fifth Circuit rule in Durrett.88
However, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed and held, that for purposes
of § 548, the term "reasonably equivalent value" simply means whatever value
was received at a noncollusive and regularly conducted foreclosure sale.8 9 The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's decision rested, in part, on the settled state of law
regarding inadequate foreclosure sale prices.
If we consider the question of price adequacy in the
context offoreclosure law we find, not surprisingly, that mere

OKLA. CiTY U. L. REV. 579 (1985); Howard A. Elliott, Comment, MortgageForeclosureSales
as FraudulentConveyances: Living Under Durrett, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 631 (1986).
80. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323, 327
(8th Cir. 1984); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 B.R. 818, 821

(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 B.R. 434,
448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
81. See, e.g., Harman v. First Am. Bank (In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Group, Inc.),

956 F.2d 479,485 (4th Cir. 1992); Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir.

1988).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id.
21 B.R. 424 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id. at425.
Id.
Id. at 427.
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inadequacy will not upset a foreclosure sale. "[T]here must be
in addition proof of some element of fraud, unfairness, or
oppression as accounts for and brings about the inadequacy
of price." The trial court's construction of §548 would
radically alter these rules. Any foreclosure sale which failed
to bring 70% of the property's market value could be set
aside by a bankruptcy trustee or a debtor-in-possession for a
period of one year.9"
Ultimately, the court observed that the "law of foreclosure should be
harmonized with the law of fraudulent conveyances"91 and consequently

construed the reasonably equivalent value requirement to mean the
consideration received at a noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sale.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the holding of the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, but it did so on the basis that a "transfer" had not
occurred within the one year reach-back period required by § 548.92
In 1988 the Seventh Circuit also addressed the issue of what constitutes a
reasonably equivalent value in the context of a foreclosure sale. In Bundles v.
Baker (In re Bundles)93 the debtor had lived in the home for over twenty
years.94 At certain times, the debtor was unable to meet his mortgage payments
because of health problems, and the mortgagee commenced an action in state
court seeking foreclosure of the debtor's residence. The state court entered a
default judgment against the debtor in the amount of $4,696.46, 9- and, after
proper notice and in compliance with Indiana foreclosure law, a sheriff's sale
of the debtor's residence was held.96 At the sale, a third party unrelated to the
foreclosing mortgagee purchased the property for $5,066.80. 9' At the time of
the foreclosure sale the property was worth $15,500. 9s After the foreclosure and
sale of his residence, the debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code and, shortly thereafter, sought to avoid the foreclosure
sale as a fraudulent transfer.99
After rejecting the opinions of both the bankruptcy court and the district
court on the proper approach to § 548 in the context of real property
foreclosures, the Seventh Circuit relied on the plain language of the section
coupled with the clear intent for a federal standard:

90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. 725 F.2d at 1200-01.
93. 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
94. Id. at 817.
95. Id. In addition, an IRS tax lien against the real estate was reduced to a personal
judgment against the debtor in the amount of $2,666. Id.
96. Id. The debtor was insolvent at the time of the foreclosure sale. Id.
97. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 817.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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In our view, in defining reasonably equivalent value, the
court should neither grant a conclusive presumption in favor
of a purchaser at a regularly conducted, noncollusive
foreclosure sale, nor limit its inquiry to a simple comparison
of the sale price to the fair market value. Reasonable
equivalence should depend on all the facts of each case."'
Under Bundles, the federal standard rests on the "purpose of § 548's
avoiding powers-to preserve the assets of the estate." Thus, a court must
focus on what the debtor received in return for what he surrendered.''
Consequently, it is appropriate to consider, as a starting point,
the fair market value. However, the fact that the sale was the
result of a foreclosure rather than an arn's length transaction
between a willing buyer and a willing seller is also of
considerable importance. Therefore, the bankruptcy court
must focus ultimately on the fair market value as affected by
the fact of foreclosure. As a practical matter, the foreclosure
sale price is the only means of measuring the effect of
foreclosure on the value of the property. Indeed, in usual
circumstances, it would be appropriate to permit a rebuttable
presumption that the price obtained at the foreclosure sale
represents reasonably equivalent value. However, the
bankruptcy court also must examine the foreclosure
transaction in its totality to determine whether the procedures
employed were calculated not only to secure for the
mortgagee the value of its interest but also to return to the
debtor-mortgagor his equity in the property. The bankruptcy

100. Id. at 824; see also General Indus. v. Shea (In re General Indus.), 79 B.R. 124,
133 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (indicating that the standards of value at public foreclosures are
disputable; therefore, any rule tied only to value should not be applied); Ruebeck v. Attleboro
Say. Bank (Inre Ruebeck), 55 B.R. 163, 168 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (finding the proper inquiry
regarding fair market value is a case-by-case analysis); Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re
Adwar), 55 B.R. 111, 114-15 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding in accordance with the Second
and Eighth Circuit that the question ofvalue should be determined on a case-by-case basis); First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 45 B.R. 523, 528 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984) ("[A]n
absolute inflexible percentage benchmark should not be applied without regard to the facts of
each case."); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 B.R. 434, 448 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1982) (holding that "reasonable equivalence will depend on the facts of each case");
Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424, 428 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982)
(Volinn, J., dissenting) (arguing that the concept of reasonably equivalent value requires that the
trial court examine the consideration received in a foreclosure sale in the factual context of a
particular case and concluding "that the price paid at a regularly conducted foreclosure sale
should be given, at best, a strong presumption of adequacy").
101. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824 (citing Martin v. Phillips (In re Butcher), 58 B.R. 128,
130 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986)).
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court therefore must consider such factors as whether there
was a fair appraisal of the property, whether the property was
advertised widely, and whether competitive bidding was
encouraged.' 2
Thus, at one time, bankruptcy courts labored under four different
approaches to the application of fraudulent transfer law to real property
foreclosures. First, the Durrettrule replaced the vague "reasonably equivalent
value" requirement with a bright-line rule.' °3 If the bid price was less than
seventy percent of the fair value of the property, then the foreclosure is a
constructively fraudulent transfer.'0 4 No further thought or analysis was
necessary. Second, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel opinion in Madrid also
replaced the vague standard in § 548(a)(2) with a bright-line rule.'0 5 If the real
property foreclosure was conducted in a regular, noncollusive manner, then the
bid price constituted reasonably equivalent value as a matter of law.' 0 6 Third,
the Ninth Circuit opinion in Madrid ignored the value issue altogether by
concluding that a real property foreclosure sale did not constitute a transfer
under §§ 101(54) and 548(a).' 7 Finally, the Seventh Circuit inBundlesdirectly
addressed the value issue by requiring bankruptcy courts to consider all the
facts and circumstances in assessing whether a real property foreclosure
constituted a fraudulent transfer. 8 Thus, the stage was set for the Supreme
Court to resolve the debate.
In the aptly-named case of BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.'0 9 a third party
purchased property at a foreclosure sale for $433,000. 'o' The debtor filed for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code about three months after the
foreclosure sale."' After the filing, the debtor sought to set aside the
foreclosure sale, claiming that the fair market value of the property was
$725,000 at the time ofthe sale." 2 Thus, according to the debtor-in-possession,
the sale constituted a constructively fraudulent transfer." 3
The Court, in its majority opinion by Justice Scalia, focused on the term

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201,203 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id.
Madrid,21 B.R. at 427.

106. Id.
107. Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1984).
108. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824-25 (7th Cir. 1988). Other
courts followed the Seventh Circuit approach. See, e.g., Grissom v. Johnson (In reGrissom), 955
F.2d 1440, 1445 (1 lth Cir. 1992), overruled by BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531
(1994); Brown v. Goldome Realty Credit Corp. (In re Brown), 126 B.R. 481,484 (Bankr. D. Md.

1991).
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

511 U.S. 531 (1994).
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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"reasonably equivalent value."' 'After noting that the Bankruptcy Code did not
define the term, the Court's analysis turned to the question: reasonably
equivalent to what?" 5 According to the Court, Durrettand Bundles answered
this question by concluding that what the debtor received had to be reasonably
equivalent to the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure
sale."16 The Court determined that this was the wrong "benchmark against
which determination of reasonably equivalent value is to be measured,"" 7 and
that absent some congressional indication to the contrary, the appropriate
benchmark against which to measure reasonably equivalent value was the
proceeds actually received at the foreclosure sale." 8
Equating the proceeds received at foreclosure with reasonably equivalent
value is troubling in two respects. First, if Congress intended the term
"reasonably equivalent value" in the context of foreclosures to mean the
amount received, the use of the word "reasonably" is rendered meaningless and
tautological. The debtor will always receive the exact equivalent of the amount
received at the foreclosure, either applied to a reduction of the debt or, in those
rare instances in which the bid exceeds the debt, to be applied in satisfaction of
the debt with the surplus returned to the debtor. Thus, the Court turned the test
for reasonably equivalent value into a truism. In effect, the Court interpreted
the statute to mean that § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to
foreclosure sales, at least not to properly conducted ones. The second troubling
aspect of the BFP holding concerns the definition of "transfer" in the 1984
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code." 9 The definition of transfer was
modified expressly to include the "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of
redemption,""'2 but the Court ignored this point entirely.
The Court justified its interpretation of the phrase "reasonably equivalent
value" by stating that "[t]o say that the 'reasonably equivalent value' language
in the fraudulent transfer provision of the Bankruptcy Code requires a
foreclosure sale to yield a certain minimum price beyond what state foreclosure
law requires, is to say, in essence, that the Code has adopted Durrett or
Bundles."''2' Though the Court acknowledged that "Congress has the power
pursuant to its constitutional grant of authority over bankruptcy"'" to do just
that, the Court declined to interpret the phrase absent "clearer textual
guidance. '"" Consequently, the Court read "reasonably equivalent value" to

114. Id. at 542-43.
115. Id. at 543.
116. Id. at 536-37.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 545, 548-49.
119. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
120. BFP,511 U.S. at 545,548-49.
121. Id. at 542-43.
122. Id. at 543.
123. Id.
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mean that the Bankruptcy Code had rejected Durrettand Bundles.'"
For allpractical purposes, BFPseverely limited the use of § 548 challenges
to real property foreclosure sales, regardless of the amount bid at such sales. In
theory, § 548 continues to exist as a means to attack irregular or collusive
foreclosures as well as foreclosures where the debtor had an actual intent to
defraud his creditors. However, these attacks add little force because such sales
could be set aside on the basis of state law even absent § 548.125
III. AVOIDABLE PREFERENCE LAW UNDER § 547 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Many practitioners perceive the avoidable preference power as one of the
26
most used and most important powers possessed by a bankruptcy trustee.
The operative preference provision in the present Bankruptcy Code is
§ 547(b).' 27 The preference power has a dual purpose: (1) furthering the policy
of equality of distribution'28 (although a more accurate description is that the
power protects the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme) 29 and (2) dissuading
opt-out behavior by creditors who hope to bypass the bankruptcy process by
forcing30 the debtor to pay them before the commencement of the bankruptcy
case.

A. Elements of an Avoidable Preference
An avoidable preference is (i) any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property; (ii) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (iii) for or on account of an
antecedent debt owed by the debtor before the transfer was made; (iv) made
while the debtor was insolvent; (v) made on or within ninety days before the
date of the filing of the petition (or within one year if the creditor is an insider);
and (vi) that enables the creditor to receive more than it would have received
under a Chapter 7 liquidation.!3 The trustee, or the debtor-in-possession in a
Chapter 11 or Chapter 12 case, shoulders the burden of proof on all the
elements of an avoidable preference action; 32 however, there is a statutory

124. Id. at 545.
125. See Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1994).
126. See GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
§ 4.03(c), at 153 (2d ed. 1988); Countryman, supra note 58, at 713.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The genesis of the preference power is § 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended.
128. See TREISTER ET AL., supra note 126, § 4.03(c), at 153.
129. See Countryman, supra note 58, at 715.
130. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMiTs OF BANKRUPTCY LAV 124-25
(1986).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). Section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code enables the trustee
to recover the property transferred, or its value if the court so orders, when a transfer is avoided
pursuant to § 547. Id. Section 541(a)(3) includes in the list of property comprising the estate
any interest in property that the trustee recovers under § 550. Id. § 541(a)(3).
132. Id. § 547(g).
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presumption that the debtor is insolvent on or within ninety days of filing a
petition in bankruptcy.'33 Furthermore, if the creditor who received the alleged
avoidable preference was an insider of the debtor, 34 then the operative period
is extended from ninety days to one year before the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy.'35 Following is a concise discussion of preference law to highlight
the key provisions addressing unreasonable creditor bid-ins at foreclosure sales.
1. Transfer of the Debtor's Property'36
"Transfer" is broadly defined in § 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code to
include every mode or disposition of an interest in property, voluntary or

133. Id. § 547(f).
134. Section 101(31) defines "insider" to include:
(A)
if the debtor is an individual(i)
relative of the debtor or of a
general partner of the debtor;
(ii)
partnership in which the debtor
is a general partner;
(iii)
general partner of the debtor; or
(iv)
corporation of which the debtor
is a director, officer, or person
in control;
(B)
if the debtor is a corporation(i)
director of the debtor;
(ii)
officer of the debtor;
(iii)
person in control of the debtor;
(iv)
partnership in which the debtor
is a general partner;
(v)
general partner of the debtor; or
(vi)
relative of a general partner,
director, officer, or person in
control of the debtor;
(C)
if the debtor is a partnership(i)
general partner in the debtor;
(ii)
relative of a general partner in,
general partner of, or person in
control of the debtor;
(iii)
partnership in which the debtor
is a general partner;
(iv)
general partner of the debtor; or
(v)
person in control of the debtor;
(D)
if the debtor is a municipality, elected
official of the debtor or relative of an
elected official of the debtor;
(E)
affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such
affiliate were the debtor; and
(F)
managing agent of the debtor.
Id. § 101(31).
135. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
136. Id. § 547(b).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss2/6

20

Mattingly: Reestablishment of Bankruptcy Review of Oppressive Foreclosure Sa

1999]

AVOIDANCE POWERS AND CREDITOR BID-INS

involuntary, including the creation of a lien on the debtor's property and
foreclosure under the real property laws.'37 Thus, not only is the payment of
money by cash or check encompassed by the definition of "transfer," but also
subject to scrutiny are actions such as filing an abstract ofjudgment or Article
9 financing statement.' 38
Once the triggering transfer has been identified, one must still determine
whether the transfer is of a debtor's property.3 If a debtor acts as a mere
conduit of funds or if the funds that go from a third party to the debtor and
subsequently to the creditor are earmarked, courts have
consistently concluded
40
that the transfer is not one of a debtor's property.
As previously discussed, a real property foreclosure sale is a "transfer"
under § 101(54). Furthermore, the foreclosure usually involves the property of
the debtor. Thus, these elements of an avoidable preference are generally met
and do not pose a problem in the bid-in scenario.
2.

4

To orfor the Benefit of a Creditor11

The Bankruptcy Code defines a creditor to include an entity that holds a
claim against the debtor that, for preference purposes, arose before the filing
of the petition in a bankruptcy case. 42 A claim is defined in § 101(5). '4 In the
avoidable preference section, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code included not
only transfers to a creditor, but also for the benefit of a creditor.' 44 Assume the
debtor owes a debt to A, and A owes a debt to B. However, B is not a creditor
of the debtor. If the debtor paid A, and then A paid B, assuming all other

137. Id. § 101(54).
138. See Williams, supra note 13, at 71-73.
139. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
140. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 151 B.R. 63, 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993); Carson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 172 N.E. 475, 482 (N.Y. 1930).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1).

142. Id. § 101(10)(A).
143. Section 101(5) states:
"Claim" means(A) right to payment, whether or not such
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach
ofperformance if such breach gives rise to
right to payment, whether or not such right
to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured.
Id.§ 101(5).

144. Id.§ 547(b)(1).
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elements are met, the transfer is one between the debtor and its creditor A.
However, if on directions from A the debtor pays B, assuming all other
elements are met, the transfer is for the benefit of the debtor's creditorA. Either
transfer satisfies the second element of an avoidable preference under § 547(b).
Again, this element generally will not pose problems in the bid-in context.
3. Foror on Account ofan Antecedent Debt

145

The third element of an avoidable transfer requires that the creation of the
debt occur before the transfer was made. Usually this can be determined by a
straightforward comparison of the date the debt arose to the date of the transfer.
Nonetheless, in some circumstances this simple comparison can be deceptive
because of the timing rules imposed by § 547(e). 46
Section 547(e) employs an artificial test to establish when the transfertakes
place: the general rule is that the transfer takes place when it becomes public
knowledge throughperfectionrather than the actual date of the transfer. Section
547(e) is the drafters' attempt to protect against secret liens. It provides that as
to real estate transfers, a transfer occurs when it is good against a bona fide
purchaser of the real estate. 47 As to personal property transfers, the transfer
occurs when it becomes perfected as against a judicial lien creditor.'48
Furthermore, a transfer perfected within ten days after it is made is deemed to
occur when it becomes effective between the parties as a matter of law. 49
' This
element also does not pose serious concerns in the bid-in context largely
because of cases holding that a foreclosure sale constitutes a transfer.150
4. Made Within Certain Time PeriodsProvided in the Bankruptcy
Codes''
Not all preferences are voidable. Section 547(b) contains certain time limits
or reach-back periods, limiting the power of a trustee to attack prepetition
transfers. The time period is a compromise of several policies-the policies of
finality and protection of title, on the one hand, and the limitation of opt-out
behavior on the part of creditors on the other. For most creditors, the preference
period is ninety days from the filing of the petition.'52 The filing date is
excluded from the count, but the last day is included, unless it is a Saturday,

145. Id. § 547(b)(2).
146. Id. § 547(e).
147. Id. § 547(e)(1)(A).
148. Id. § 547(e)(1)(B).
149. Id. § 547(e)(2)(A).
150. See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994); Ehring v. Western
Community Moneycenter (In re Ehring), 900 F.2d 184, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1990).
151. II U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(4), (e)(2).
152. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
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Sunday, or legal holiday.'53 Again, the time of the transfer as determined by
§ 547(e) will be determinative as to whether the transfer occurred on or within
154
ninety days (or one year, if an insider) of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
For creditors who are insiders, l"' the preference period is expanded from
ninety days to one year from the filing of the petition. 5 6 The assumption

implicit in expanding the preference period for insiders is that they are in a
position to know of the debtor's precarious financial condition before most
others. 5 7 Again, this element does not pose significant concern in the bid-in
context.
5. Debtor Insolvency'58
Insolvency is generally defined under the Bankruptcy Code as the sum of
the debtor's debts exceeding the fair value of the debtor's property: the balance
sheet approach to insolvency. 59 Section 547(f) creates the rebuttable
presumption that the debtor is insolvent for ninety days preceding the filing of
the bankruptcy petition.'60 Determination of insolvency in the partnership
context may be more complicated because it takes into account the sum of the
excess of the value of the partners' separate property over the partners' separate
debts as well as the partnership's property.' 6' However, insolvency does not
generally pose difficult issues in the bid-in context.
6. PreferentialEffect'62
The final element of an avoidable preference requires that the transfer have
the effect of giving the transferee more than it otherwise would receive in a
Chapter 7 liquidation case had the transfer not been made. 63 This preferential
effect is the essence of an avoidable preference action.'"
The § 547(b)(5) element of an avoidable preference is almost always met
if an unsecured creditor receives a payment.' 65 Conversely, if the debtor pays
a fully secured creditor, and the security interest is not avoidable under one of
the avoiding powers, the transferby the debtor is not a preference. 6 6 A transfer
153. Id. app. Bankr. R. 9006(a).
154. Id. § 547(e).
155. Id. § 101(31); see supra note 134.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B).
157. Id. § 101(31).
158. Id. §§ 547(b)(3), 101(32).
159. Id. § 101(32).
160. Id. § 547(f).
161. Id. § 101(32)(B).
162. Id. § 547(b)(5).
163. Id.
164. See Countryman, supra note 58, at 733-34.
165. Id. at 736.
166. Id. at 739-40.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: 363

to a fully secured creditor gives the creditor no more than it would have
received under a Chapter 7 liquidation. Additionally, payment of a § 507(a)
priority claim is not an avoidable preference if the estate houses sufficient
assets to pay all higher and equal priority claimants; 67 however, § 547(b)(5) is
generally met where the debtor has made payments to an undersecured creditor.
The law presumes that, at least absent relinquishment of a portion of the
collateral equal to the payment made by the debtor, any payment within the
ninety day preference period is a reduction of an undersecured creditor's
unsecured claim and therefore amounts to a preferential transfer for the benefit
of the undersecured creditor. 68
It is this element of the avoidable preference action that lies at the center
of the cases that have addressed whether a creditor bid-in at a real property
foreclosure sale could constitute an avoidable preference.' 69 For example,
assume Debtor owes $1,000 to Creditor secured by real property valued at
$10,000. Upon default, Creditor forecloses on the property, bidding the full
amount of the debt at the sale, with the result that $1,000 is the winning bid
price. Thus, Creditor realizes an asset worth $10,000 from the foreclosure sale;
whereas if the transfer had not been made, the creditor would have been
entitled to only $1,000, the amount of its secured claim under a Chapter 7
liquidation. Consequently, Creditor appears to have received more than it
would have in a Chapter 7 case and had the transfer not been made.
B. ConceptualInterface Between § 548 and § 547
A trustee's ability to employ § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code is in one sense
more limitedthan theDurretttheory of attacking the foreclosure as a fraudulent
transfer largely because of the enlarged time window provided in § 548. In the
case of § 547, the transfer must have occurred within ninety days of the filing
of the bankruptcy petition. 170 In contrast, § 548 permits a reach-back period of
one year, and potentially far longer by resort to § 544 and state fraudulent
transfer law."
Section 547 is further limited by the requirement that the transfer be "on
account of an antecedent debt."17' This insulates any sale to third parties and
restricts the avoidance power to situations in which the creditor successfully
bids in the property at the foreclosure sale and becomes the owner. However,

167. See TREISTER, supra note 126, § 4.03(c)(1)(G), at 159.
168. See Drabkin v. A.I. Credit Corp., 800 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Countryman, supra note 58, at 744.
169. Craig H. Averch & Michael J. Collins, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as
PreferentialTransfers: Another Serious Threatto Secured Creditors?,24 TEx. TEcH L. REV.
985, 1004-06 (1993); David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in the Crucible of Voidable
PreferenceLaw, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv.211, 274-79 (1995).
170. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1994).
171. Id. § 548(a).
172. Id. § 547(b)(2).
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this latter limitation is not significant in light of the fact that in the vast majority
of real property foreclosures, the foreclosing lender is the high, and often only,
73
bidder.
Interestingly, § 547 can be interpreted as broader than § 548 in at least one
way. Even under Durrett,a bid for property in the amount of seventy percent
of the property's value or more has prevented a sale from being set aside as a
constructive fraudulent transfer.' 74 Thus, § 547 could be used to void even
those sales where the bid price was in excess of seventy percent of the value of
the property, so long as the creditor would receive more than it would in a
Chapter 7 case had the transfer not been made.' Obviously, the incentive to
void a sale greatly diminishes as the bid price approaches the fair market value
of the property.
IV. THE ANOMALIES OF BANKRUPTCY LAW AS APPLIED TO REAL PROPERTY
FORECLOSURES
This section presents various scenarios under which the debtor, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, transfers assets to creditors and non-creditors. Both
fraudulent transfer law and preference law are then applied to predict the
outcome if such transfers were challenged. Though it would appear that the
outcome would be the same regardless of whether the transfer was voluntary
or involuntary 7 6 and regardless of whether the transfer was challenged in or out
of the bankruptcy setting, existing case law shows this is not the case.'77
Example 1: Assume that Debtor voluntarilytransfers $500 to a non-creditor
thirdparty and receives nothingfrom the non-creditorin return.
Analysis:
Regardless of whether this transfer is harmful to Debtor's
creditors, it is not subject to avoidance as a preferential
transfer for a variety of reasons, the most obvious being that
there is no antecedent debt as required to void preferential
transfers.' However, assuming that the transfer is harmful to
the creditors because Debtor is insolvent, it should be easy to
avoid this transfer as either an actual or a constructive
fraudulent transfer. 79 As conventional wisdom goes, a debtor
must be just before he is generous.

173. Mattingly, supra note 6, at 95.

174. See, e.g., Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20, 25 (3d
Cir. 1991).
175. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5).
176. See id. § 101(54).
177. See generallyBFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 543-44 n.7 (1994)
(comparing voluntary and involuntary transfers under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code).
178. See I1 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2).
179. See id. § 548(a).
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Example 2: Assume Debtor voluntarily transfers$500 to a creditorthat was
owed $100.
Analysis:
In this case, it would seem that the transfer can be avoided as
either a preference or possibly a fraudulent transfer. With
respect to the preference, the $100 debt satisfies the
requirement of an antecedent debt, and it should be easy to
establish that the creditor has received more than it otherwise
would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation 80 Even if the creditor
held a secured claim with a lien in collateral valued at $500,
the creditor would not be entitled to receive any more than
the amount of its debt, and thus still appears to have been
treated preferentially. Fraudulent transfer law should likewise
be available to avoid this transaction and recover the transfer
of assets for the benefit of all creditors. Even if the transfer
was not made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors, it nonetheless would be difficult to see how the
transfer of $500 to reduce a $100 debt could be construed as
providing the debtor with reasonably equivalent value for the
$500.181

Each of the above two scenarios assumed that the transfer consisted of
$500 cash. But what if, instead of cash, the transfer was of real or personal
property? Would the outcome be the same? Disregarding the problem of
correct valuation of the assets, it would seem that the form of payment should
not be relevant. However, it is.
The first two scenarios also assumed that the transfers were voluntary.
There are situations in which the transfer of the debtor's assets occurs on an
involuntary basis. The most common mechanisms by which this occurs involve
collection actions against a debtor such as garnishments, judicial liens, and real
and personal property foreclosures. In the following scenarios, the transfers
occur involuntarily.
Example 3: Assume thatDebtorinvoluntarilytransfers$500 to a non-creditor
in exchangefor $100.
Analysis:
This involuntary transfer would in all likelihood be the result
of a forced sale. Instead of $500 cash, the asset being
transferred would be the property being sold. The noncreditor
would be the high bidder at the sale, and, in exchange for the
property, would deliver the purchase price to the creditor
conducting the sale. Nonetheless, for purposes of this
scenario, assume that the asset being transferred is actually

180. See id. § 547(b)(5).
181. See id. § 548(a)(2).
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$500 cash in exchange for the $100 bid. As in Example 1,
above, it would be difficult to construe this as a preference to
82
the noncreditor buyer because there is no antecedent debt.
Furthermore, this transfer would not be a preference for the
creditor that forced the sale because that creditor will only
retain proceeds up to the amount of the debt (unless the
selling creditor had perfected its judgment lien within ninety
days of bankruptcy and would not receive as much in a
Chapter 7 liquidation). Could the transfer of $500 cash for
$100 be avoided as a fraudulent transfer? It is difficult to
fathom that it could not be.
Example 4: Assume that instead ofcash, the $500 asset being transferredto
the noncreditoris personalproperty.
Analysis:
If it was personal property, almost every court would
conclude that it did not constitute a fraudulent transfer
because there was no transfer within the reach-back period. 3
The transfer did not occur when the sale was conducted;
rather, it occurred when the lien was granted. 8
Example 5: What ifthe asset being transferredto the noncreditoris $500 of
realpropertypursuantto a foreclosuresale?
Analysis:
Again, most courts would conclude that the transfer was not
fraudulent absent some form of collusion or irregularity.
However, this is not based on the absence of a transfer.
Section 101(54) makes clear that the term "transfer" includes
foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption."' The basis
for holding that no fraudulent transfer occurred is the
Supreme Court's holding in BFP.'6 For purposes of
bankruptcy law, the proceeds received at a regularly
conducted noncollusive foreclosure sale are deemed a
reasonably equivalent value.' 87 Contrast this with the outcome
in Examples 1 and 2 above, where a fraudulent transfer would
likely exist if Debtor voluntarily transfers $500 in property in
satisfaction of the $100 debt.
Example 6: Assume Debtor involuntarilytransfers $500 in property,but this
182. See id. § 547(b)(2).
183. See Williams, supra note 13, at 71-72, n.85.
184. However, the debtor may possess a cause of action in the event the sale of
personal property was not commercially reasonable in all aspects. See U.C.C. §§ 9-504, 9-507
(1997).
185. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).
186. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
187. Id. at 545.
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tine the high bidder is the creditor who forced the sale, and
outbids the noncreditorbuyer describedabove by $10.
If Debtor owes $110 or more, no money actually changes
hands, and the creditor merely credit bids or bidsin the
property by crediting the amount bid against the amount of
the debt, 8 can this situation be construed either as a
preference or a fraudulent transfer? With regard to a
fraudulent transfer, the answer as supplied by BFP is an
emphatic no. Could this transfer constitute a preference? At
first the answer seems to be no because the same transfer for
a lower price detailed in Example 4 is not a preference. But
closer analysis reveals that this is not necessarily true. If the
creditor bidsin the full amount owed ($110), then even where
the creditor is fully secured or oversecured, the creditor has
still received more than it would have in a Chapter 7
liquidation ($500 vs. $110)... on account of an antecedent
debt. 9' This would seem to fit within the elements of an
avoidable preference. If the creditor was undersecured, the
preference would be clearer since this particular creditor
would be receiving full payment on account of an antecedent
debt, which is more than it would have received in a Chapter
7 liquidation.' 9'

Following is a matrix that spells out the disparate treatment of transfers
based on the nature of the transfer (voluntary or involuntary), the status of the
transferee (creditor or noncreditor), the type of property transferred (personal
or real), and the application of the specific avoidance power (preference or
fraudulent transfer). A "yes" entry in a cell of the matrix means that the
scenario is subject to attack, a "no" means that it is not.

188.
189.
190.
191.

See Mattingly, supra note 6, at 101.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5).
See id. § 547(b)(2).
See id. § 547(b)(5).
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TABLE 1
PREFERENCE ANALYSIS

Personal

Real

Creditor/Voluntary Transfer

Yes

Yes

Creditor/Involuntary Transfer

No

? (2)

Noncreditor/Voluntary Transfer

Nol

No (1)

Noncreditor/Involuntary Transfer

Nol

No (1)

(1) No antecedent debt as required by § 547.
(2) This question is the focus of the Article.

TABLE 2
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ANALYSIS
Personal

Real

Creditor/Voluntary Transfer

Yes

Yes

Creditor/Involuntary Transfer

No (2)

No (1)

Noncreditor/Voluntary Transfer

Yes

Yes

Noncreditor/Involuntary Transfer

No (2)

No (1) &
(BFP)

(1) See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994). Even prior to BFP,
§ 3b of the UFTA would prevent a state law challenge on the basis of a
fraudulent transfer in those states that adopted the Act.
(2) Generally no.
Are there policy reasons to justify this disparate treatment of the transfers,
depending on whether the transfer was voluntary or involuntary, to a creditor or
noncreditor, concerning real property or personal property? Part IV of this
Article explores this question.
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V. AUTHORITIES ADDRESSING REAL PROPERTY FORECLOSURES AS AVOIDABLE
PREFERENCES

Prior to the limitation oftheDurrett'92 rule by the Supreme Court in BFP,'93
a few cases did indeed make use of § 547 to set aside oppressive foreclosure
sales as voidable preferences. 94 However, not all such attempts were successful,
and some courts refused to apply § 547 to foreclosure sales, holding that
foreclosures are not the type of transfer preference laws are intended to
address.' 9 s
With the elimination by BFPof the constructive fraudulent transfer attack,
it might be expected that trustees and debtors will increasingly use § 547 to
attack real property foreclosures as preferential in order to recapture debtor
equity for the benefit of the estate. However, this has not been the case. In fact,
there are only two reported decisions after BFP where such an effort has been
made, and neither was successful.' 96 Trustees' and debtors' counsel have
apparently concluded, from their reading of BFP, that any effort to attack a
foreclosure on the basis of an avoidable preference theory would be futile.
Following is a careful discussion of the authorities on point. Section A
discusses authorities that have favorably entertained avoidable preference
actions. Section B discusses authorities that have rejected an avoidable
preference action.
A. Authorities Concluding that Foreclosure Sales Are Avoidable
Preferences
One of the first decisions to hold that a foreclosure sale could be avoided as
a preferential transfer was FederalNationalMortgageAss'n v. Wheeler (In re
Wheeler).' 97 In Wheeler the original borrowers died and left their interest in the
property to several heirs.'98 Two of the heirs quitclaimed their interests in the
property to the third heir, who had lived on the property since the time of its

192. The Durrett rule refers to the dicta in the decision in which the court indicated
that any bid amount less than 70% would likely be construed as a fraudulent transfer. This
quickly came to be treated as a bright-line rule by many practitioners in the Fifth Circuit. See,
e.g., White v. Luton (In re White), 47 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
193. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1994).
194. See Winters v. First Union Nat'l Bank (In re Winters), 119 B.R. 283,284 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990); Park North Partners, Ltd. v. Park North Assocs. (In re Park North Partners,
Ltd.), 85 B.R. 916, 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In
re Wheeler), 34 B.R. 818, 822 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983).
195. See, e.g., Cottrell v. United States (In re Cottrell), 213 B.R. 33,43-44 (M.D. Ala.
1997).
196. See O'Neill v. Dell (In re O'Neill), 204 B.R. 881 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); Big
Yank Corp. v. Bank One (In re Water Valley Finishing, Inc.), 170 B.R. 831 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994).
197. 34 B.R. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983).
198. Id. at 819.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss2/6

30

Mattingly: Reestablishment of Bankruptcy Review of Oppressive Foreclosure Sa

1999]

AVOIDANCE POWERS AND CREDITOR BID-INS

purchase in 1971.' 9 By 1982, the mortgage payments were in arrears, and
foreclosure proceedings were instituted. E"' After properly accelerating the
indebtedness, the lender foreclosed the property, and, being the high bidder at
the sale, purchased the property for the amount of its debt, $15,044.79.01
Approximately three weeks after the foreclosure sale, the debtor filed a
petition in bankruptcy and included the lender's claim in her Chapter 13 plan.202
When the lender objected to inclusion in the plan and sought approval of the
mortgage foreclosure, the debtor commenced an action to set aside the sale
under both §§ 548 and 547 of the Bankruptcy Code." 3 The lender asserted that
the value of the property was $21,000, meaning that the bid-in purchase price
was almost seventy-two percent of the value.20 4 However, the debtor asserted
that the property was worth $30,000 and that ithad been appraised by the county
tax appraiser at $23,460."'5 Ultimately the court determined that the value of the
property was $24,000 and determined that because the bid-in price was less than
sixty-three percent of the court's valuation of the property, the sale would be set
aside as a constructive
fraudulent transfer consistent with the Fifth Circuit's
20 6
holding in Durrett.
The Wheeler court also found that the sale constituted an avoidable
preferential transfer under § 547.207 Acknowledging that the lender was fully
secured, and therefore entitled to receive the full value of its claim, the court
stated that the lender was entitled to receive no more than the amount of its
claim.20 3 By being both a creditor and purchaser at the sale, the lender was able
to capture the additional value of the property above the indebtedness; thus, the
foreclosure sale enabled the lender to receive more than it would have received
in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 20 9 Consequently, because the other requirements of
§ 547 had been met, the court held that the foreclosure sale constituted a
preferential transfer.210
The court's analysis and holding in Wheeler is consistent with the result
reached in Winters v. First Union NationalBank (In re Winters),2 the most
recent decision to hold that a foreclosure can indeed constitute a preference
under § 547. In Winters the lender was the high bidder at its foreclosure sale and
purchased the property for a bid-in amount of $14,284.26.212 The lender

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 819-20.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 821-22.
Id. at 822.
Id.
See Bankruptcy Code, I1 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1994).
Wheeler, 34 B.R. at 822.
119 B.R. 283 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
Id. at 284.
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subsequently listed the property for sale at $60,000 and eventually sold it for
$30,000, the amount of the first offer. 1 3 The debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition
in bankruptcy within 90 days of the foreclosure challenging the foreclosure as
both a fraudulent transfer and an avoidable preference.2" 4 The court found the
result inequitable because the lender captured over $15,715 of equity at the
expense of the unsecured creditors and held that the plaintiff was entitled to
prevail under either theory of recovery.21
Another decision in which § 547 was used to avoid a foreclosure sale was
ParkNorthPartners,Ltd. v. ParkNorthAssociates (In re ParkNorth Partners,
Ltd.).216 The bankruptcy judge reached this result only after being directed by the
district court. 217 In his opinion, Judge Kahn noted that he was voiding the bid-in
reluctantly and urged the district court to reconsider its holding that a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale held pursuant to state law could constitute a preference under
§ 547.2l8 The bankruptcy judge strongly believed that such a foreclosure could
never constitute a preference because it was not the type of transfer Congress
intended to be recaptured through § 547.29 The bulk of the bankruptcy judge's
opinion focused on why, in his view, real property foreclosures should not be
preferences. In Judge Kahn's opinion, a foreclosure sale could neverbe set aside
as a preference because it did not meet the requirements imposed by § 547;
namely, the transfer did not enable the creditor to receive more than it would
under a Chapter 7 case, and it was not on account of an antecedent debt.22
According to him, because fully secured creditors are not entitled to any
distribution of property of the estate through the bankruptcy system, it is
illogical to try to decide if the creditor would have received more, and this
element of a preference simply cannot be applied to a foreclosure sale.22'
Furthermore, Judge Kahn maintained that there could be no transfer on account
of an antecedent debt even in the event of a "surplus" above the amount of the
indebtedness. 21 The "surplus" constituted a windfall to the creditor and must be
analyzed as a potential fraudulent transfer and not as a transfer on account of an

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 285.

216. 85 B.R. 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
217. Id. at917.
218. Id. at 918 ("Although this Court will make such a determination, it does so
reluctantly and most respectfully urges the District Court, in the event this Judgement is
appealed, to reconsiderits holding that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale held pursuant to state law
can constitutes a preference under §547 of the Bankruptcy Code.").
219. Id.
220. Id.

221. Id. at 919; see also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Standard Bldg. Assocs., Ltd.,
87 B.R. 221, 224 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (agreeing with Judge Kahn's point of view stating "that the
provision regarding the setting aside of preferences in § 547 of the bankruptcy code does not
apply to nonjudicial foreclosures").
222. Park North Partners, Ltd. v. Park North Assocs. (In re Park North Partners, Ltd.),
85 B.R. 916, 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988)..
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antecedent debt.2" Nonetheless, pursuant to the directive of the district court
Judge Kahm held that the foreclosure of property with a stipulated value of
$1,050,000, purchased by the lender for its bid-in amount of $857,209.83,
constituted a preference under § 547.224 The judge consequently awarded the
debtor a money judgment for the difference between the two amounts.225
Similarly, in Morris Plan Co. v. Fountain(In
reFountain) 26the court held
that a prebankruptcy foreclosure sale can be set aside as a preference under
§ 547.227 In Fountain the second lien holder had purchased property, subject to
the first lien, valued at $37,500 for its bid-in amount of $6,000.228 The court
found that this sale allowed the secured lender to receive "considerable equity
which otherwise [would] have existed for the debtor" and was, therefore,
avoidable as a preference. 9
Commentators have concluded that an unreasonable bid-in may constitute
an avoidable preference because the secured party would receive more from the
foreclosure sale than it would have received in bankruptcy, where the
bankruptcy trustee could have captured the unrealized equity for the benefit of
the estate: "The theory even works if, in the hypothetical liquidation, the secured
party would have received 100¢ on the dollar-provided that, in real life, the
secured party gets more than the face amount of her claim.""3
The influential commentators Grant S. Nelson and Dale A. Whitman have
one of the strongest positions on the point:
[It is an] ironic conclusion that section 547 may be used to deal
with the lesser of two wrongs-namely, the transfer that gives
a creditor up to the full amount of her claim-but is unavailing
to the extent the transfer gives her more than she is due. The
more blameworthy creditor conduct must be dealt with, under
this reasoning, only as a fraudulent conveyance. However
unsatisfying such a conclusion may seem intuitively, it could
nevertheless be defended if the language of section 547 either
compelled such a result or was at least ambiguous."'
Nelson and Whitman conclude that the application of § 547(b) to unreasonable
bid-ins is supported by the language of the provision and the policy embodied
in the Bankruptcy Code that seeks the capture of equity for the benefit of the

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id. at 919.
Id.
32 B.R. 965 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983).
Id. at 967-68.

228. Id. at 967 n.5.
229. Id. at 968 n.6.
230. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 169, at 276-77.
231. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN,
at 682 (3d ed. 1994).
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estate. 2 Two additional commentators, Craig Averch and Michael Collins, have
addressed the second point made by Nelson and Whitman, concluding that an
unreasonable bid-in results in the loss of what may be a valuable asset to the
estate. 3 For example, if a secured party, who is owed $10,000, successfully
forecloses on real property worth $15,000 by bidding in its debt, $5,000 of
debtor equity has been transferred by the debtor to the secured creditor at the
expense of the bankruptcy estate.
Professor David Gray Carlson has also considered the issue, concluding that
unreasonable bid-ins should fall under an avoidable preference attack:
It may first appear startling that bid-ins might be voidable
preferences. Surely the secured party as buyer is a transferee
of a different capacity than the secured party as creditor. Yet,
on second thought, a secured party who bids in at her own
foreclosure sale is very much receiving debtor property in
exchange for the extinguishment of antecedent debt. So
conceived, a bid-in looks like a transfer on antecedent debt,
and hence potentially a voidable preference.23'
Carlson echoes the observations of others that application of the avoidable
preference power to unreasonable bid-ins is consistent with the language of
§ 547(b), recaptures a valuable asset for the benefit of the estate, and dissuades
unfair foreclosure sales: 5
In short, the voidable preference theory of bid-ins comports
with both the language and the policy of § 547(b), and its
imposition to trip up unfair foreclosure proceedings should be
considered a good thing. If so, courts can side-step the
Supreme Court's recent fiat inBFP and reestablishbankruptcy
review of oppressive foreclosure sales. 6
B. Authorities Concluding that Foreclosure Sales Are Not Avoidable
Preferences
Not every decision that has addressed the issue of whether a foreclosure sale
can constitute a preference concluded that an avoidable preference existed. For
example, the Ninth Circuit rejected the assertion that a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale could constitute a preference, basing its holding on the premise that a
creditor could never receive more from a foreclosure sale than it would under

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Averch & Collins, supra note 169, at 1033-34.
Carlson, supranote 169, at 277.
Id. at 277-79.
Id. at 279 (footnote omitted).
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a Chapter 7 case distribution.
In Ehringthe lender under a second deed of trust was the high bidder at its
foreclosure sale and purchased the property for its credit bid of $199,746.41.238
Less than a month later, the lender entered into a contract to sell the property for
$390,000, which represented a $110,000 profit for the lender after payment of
all the outstanding indebtedness under both the first and second liens.3 9 Within
ninety days of the foreclosure sale, the debtor filed for relief under § 547(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code, seeking recovery of the $110,000 "profit" as an avoidable
preference. 2"
The Ninth Circuit held that the foreclosure sale did indeed qualify as a
transfer within ninety days of bankruptcy, thus removing any remnant of the
24 The court further acknowledged that
Ninth Circuit's prior opinion in Madrid.
the transfer was on account of an antecedent debt;242 however, it concluded that
the sale was not a preference because the transfer did not enable the creditor to
receive more than it would otherwise receive under a Chapter 7 liquidation.243
This analysis .. .fails to consider the reality of the

transaction. If the creditor received "more" it is only because
the creditor elected to purchase the property at the foreclosure
sale rather than simply accepting the receipts of a sale to a
third party. Had the third party outbid the creditor, there could
be no preference because the price paid would not have been
transferred for an antecedent debt. Since section 547 does not
reach a third-party purchaser, it is difficult to see why the
existence of a preference should turn on the status of the
purchaser as a creditor. If the sale was defective or the
purchaserotherwise took unfair advantageof the debtor, the
transfer may be voided under section 548, regardless of
whether the purchaserwas the creditoror a thirdparty. We
see no reason to construe section 547 to permit avoidance of
an otherwise properly conducted sale based solely on the
creditor being the highest bidder.2'
The court examined what it called the "reality of the transaction" and

237. Ehring v. Western Community Moneycenter (In re Ehring), 900 F.2d 184, 189
(9th Cir. 1990).
238. Id. at 185-86.
239. Id. at 186.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 187-88. This holding was based largely on the amendment to the definition
of "transfer" in the Bankruptcy Code in 1984. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.

242. 900 F.2d at 188.
243. Id. at 189; see also Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1994) (allowing
the trustee to avoid such transfers).
244. 900 F.2d at 188-89 (emphasis added).
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determined that the "profit" realized by the lender was not the result of the
foreclosure sale, but the result of the lender's election to purchase the property
at the foreclosure sale rather than just accept the receipts of a sale to a third
party.2 45 As a result of the foreclosure sale, what the lender received was simply
the bid amount and no more.
The court was troubled by the fact that if a third-party buyer submitted the
high bid at a foreclosure sale, there would be no question that the sale could not
be construed as a preference because no "antecedent debt" would have
existed.2' The court observed that the issue of whether or not a sale constituted
a preference should not turn on the status of the purchaser.247
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit rested its holding, in part, on the availability
of a fraudulent transfer action by which a trustee can recapture any value for the
benefit of the estate. 48 Because a fraudulent transfer action was foreclosed in
BFP, the Supreme Court thwarted the Ninth Circuit's concern, expressed in
Ehring, that at least one avoidance power remain to recapture the value lost
through an unfair foreclosure sale. In light of BFP, it is no longer certain how
the Ninth Circuit would rule.249
Additionally, in FirstFederalSavings & Loan Ass "nv. StandardBuilding
Associates, Ltd.,250 the court rejected an attempt by the trustee to attack a
foreclosure sale under § 547(b). The court found that a foreclosure sale does not
conceptually fit within the definition of a preference under § 547(b). 251
The preference provision applies to those creditors who by
virtue of a pre-petition transfer receive more than they would
"under the distributive provisions of the bankruptcy code."
Fully secured mortgage holders are not entitled to anything
under the "distributiveprovisions" of the bankruptcy code,
precisely because they have liens covering specific assets.252
The court misconstrued what is meant by the term "distributive provisions"
of the Bankruptcy Code. The court embraced a stingy and artificial definition of
the term, observing that only § 726 contains the "distributive provisions" of the
Bankruptcy Code. 3 The court missed § 725, which entitles a secured party to
its collateral or collateral value in a bankruptcy case. 5 4 Section 725 fairly falls

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
North Partners,
253.
254.

Id. at 188.
Id. at 188-89.
Id.
Id. at 189.
See Carlson, supra note 169, at 278 n.272.
87 B.R. 221 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 224 (quoting Park North Partners, Ltd. v. Park North Assocs. (In re Park
Ltd.), 85 B.R. 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988)) (alteration in original).
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994).
Id. § 725.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss2/6

36

Mattingly: Reestablishment of Bankruptcy Review of Oppressive Foreclosure Sa

1999]

AVOIDANCE POWERS AND CREDITOR BID-INS

within the meaning of "distributive provisions" in § 547(b)(5). Furthermore, as
noted by Professor Carlson, the court cannot mean what it said in FirstFederal:
"If oversecured creditors receive nothingin a hypothetical liquidation test, then
anything they receive in real life violates25the § 547(b)(5) test-precisely the
opposite of what [the court] ... implies."

C. The Avoidance of UnreasonableBid-Ins as PreferencesAfter BFP
In 1994, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in BFPv. Resolution
Trust Corp. 6 The Court held in BFP that the price received at a regularly
conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale conclusively establishes "reasonably
equivalent value" of the mortgaged property for purposes of § 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 7 BFP eliminated the ability the trustee had previously
enjoyed in certain circuits to challenge real property foreclosures as
constructively fraudulent transfers based solely on the bid price received at the
foreclosure sale.
The Court in BFP did not specifically address the issue of whether a
regularly conducted foreclosure sale could reasonably continue to be challenged
as a preference. The Court expressly limited its holding to fraudulent transfer
attacks of mortgage foreclosures of real estate.25 It appears, at least
superficially, that a legitimate attack still could be launched against a foreclosure
sale as a preference. In theory, a lender that bids eighty percent of the fair
market value of the property could have that sale challenged as a preference, but
the very same sale could not be challenged as a constructive fraudulent transfer,
even if the lender had only bid forty percent of the property's fair market value.
However, the dearth of attempts to set aside foreclosure sales as preferences
after BFP seems to indicate that practitioners do not view § 547 as a viable
avoidance tool in the wake ofBFP. Indeed, one lower court has expressly stated
that the holding of BFP "is equally applicable to both kinds of avoiding
powers." 9
Why the reluctance? The answer is self-evident if the rationale for the
holding in BFP is the protection of title. Both § 548, as discussed in BFP, and
§ 547 have the potential of causing uncertainty in title to foreclosed real
property. This uncertainty theoretically leads to lower bid prices which hurt the
foreclosing creditor as well as the debtor and its estate. Thus, the policy of
protecting title to foreclosed real property in BFP applies to unreasonable

creditor bid-in situations under § 547 and would prevent the avoidance under
§ 547 as well if that is the sole policy underpinning of BFP.

255. Carlson, supra note 169, at 278-79.
256. 511 U.S. 531 (1994).

257. Id. at 545.
258. Id. at 537 n.3.
259. Cottrell v. United States (In re Cottrell), 213 B.R. 378, 383 (Bankr. M.D. Ala.
1996).
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Allowing the avoidance of a foreclosure sale under the preference statute
may not only produce the anomalous result of voiding transfers because of price
that would not be voided under fraudulent transfer law, but also of causing the
uncomfortable possibility of allowing sales to third party purchasers to stand,
regardless of price, but then voiding the very same sale if the creditor raises the
bid and becomes the high bidder. This is because the preference law could not
be applied to the third party due to the lack of an antecedent debt. Fraudulent
transfer law does not make this distinction. Under Durrett an unacceptable
transfer at less than seventy percent of the fair market value was capable of
being voided regardless of the purchaser's status.26 °
Thus, it would be unlikely that the possibility of avoiding foreclosure sales
as preferences survived the Court's decision in BFP. The dearth of reported
decisions in which such a challenge has even been attempted since BFPis strong
evidence that counsel to debtors and trustees have interpreted BFP as a bar to
an avoidable preference action. The following section explains the fallacy of
conventional wisdom.
D. The ReestablishmentofBankruptcy Review ofOppressiveForeclosure
Sales
The wording of both §§ 548 and 547 indicate that if the statutes were fairly
applied to unreasonable bid-ins, then either theory of avoidance should be
appropriate to set aside prepetition foreclosure sales of real property. First,
"reasonably equivalent value" is purposefully vague and by its terms could
require the precise inquiry articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Bundles.26 ' The
language in § 548(a)(2)(A) does not lend itself to the strained construction
employed by the Supreme Court in BFP.To be sure, there is a rich history of
fraudulent transfer law that supports such a narrow view of value,262 but with a
Court bent on a literal reading of statutes,26 the language of §548(a)(2) and the
rule in BFPcannot be easily reconciled. Second, the elements of an avoidable
preference in § 547(b) are met in its application to unreasonable creditor bid-ins
where debtor equity in the real property existed. Specifically, a creditor receives
more than it would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation had the transfer not
been made. Sound policy arguments could be made against applying § 547 to
bid-ins, but it is difficult to reconcile a creditor receiving $500 in property in
satisfaction of a $100 debt with § 547(b)(5). Furthermore, the stated policies of
the Bankruptcy Code also seem to be furthered by the use of § 547 to rescind

260. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1980).
261. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
262. For an examination of the history of fraudulent transfer law, see Williams, supra
note 13.
263. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-43 (1989)
(stating that resolving a dispute over the meaning of a relevant section begins "with the language
of the statute itself').
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unreasonable bid-ins at real property foreclosure sales. Typically, the policies
of the Bankruptcy Code are stated to be the preservation of the estate, the ratable
distribution of assets among all the unsecured creditors, and the desire to avoid
providing an incentive to creditors to make a race to the courthouse in an effort
to seize more than their ratable share just prior to the debtor's filing of a
petition."' The avoidable preference power permits a trustee to recapture a
debtor's equity in the foreclosed property for the benefit of the estate.26 Thus,
through the application of § 547(b), a valuable asset is preserved for the benefit
of the estate and the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code furthered.
Typically, in the study of bankruptcy law, if both the language of the statute
and the policies embodied in the Bankruptcy Code support a position, that
position wins the debate. This does not appear to be the case with the application
of § 547(b) to bid-ins. Trustees are not bringing these actions and courts do not
appear to be receptive. The reason given for this reluctance is the Supreme
Court's opinion in BFP, notwithstanding the fact that the Court specifically
limited its holding to fraudulent transfer actions.266 Thus, to appreciate fully the
reluctance of bankruptcy practitioners to challenge unreasonable bid-ins postBFP,one needs a more complete understanding of what was really at issue in
that case.
Why would the Supreme Court in BFP interpret the phrase "reasonably
equivalent value" in a manner that would appear to contradict both the wording
and the underlying policies of the Bankruptcy Code? What competing policies
are there that, as the four dissenting judges correctly described, would lead to
"engrafting a foreclosure-sale exception onto 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A), in
267
derogation of the straightforward language used by Congress"?
The majority opinion itself sets forth some indication of the underlying
concerns. The Court used a considerable amount of the opinion to describe the
foreclosure process and its impact on the price that can be expected for the real
property at the sale. According to the Court, a forced sale cannot be anticipated
to bring the same as a more leisurely sale, and thus the fair market value of a
property based on a typical arm's-length transaction is an inappropriate
benchmark by which to assess "reasonably equivalent value. 268
Essentially, the Court assumed that by adopting the foreclosure method and
policies that their specific laws mandate, states have determined what a
reasonable price for property sold at a forced sale should be-it is any price in
the range of bids that will not be set aside under state law as so grossly unfair or
unconscionable as to shock the conscience of the court. The Court in BFP was
unwilling to encroach upon the right of the states to make this determination
without a clearer textual meaning of "reasonably equivalent value."

264. In re Beyond Words Corp., 193 B.R. 540, 543-44 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

265.
266.
267.
268.

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 n.3 (1994).
Id. at 549 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 539-40.
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The Court was especially reluctant to allow bankruptcy law to intrude upon
state foreclosure law because "'the general welfare of society is involved in the
security of the titles to real estate' and the power to ensure that security 'inheres
in the very nature of state government.' 269 The Court's concern that "[t]he title
of every piece of realty purchased at foreclosure would be under a federally
created cloud 27 0 is obviously a major policy reason behind the Court's decision
in BFP.The majority makes an additional reference to this aspect of BFPwhen
it addresses, in a footnote, a criticism leveled by the dissent: "The dissent...
ignores the fact that it is not state authority over debtor-creditor law in general
that is at stake in this case, but the essential sovereign interest in the security and
stability of title to land.." 27' Alas, it is the concern of good title to and not the
value of real property that convinced the Court to immunize foreclosure sales
from challenge under fraudulent transfer law. Notwithstanding compelling
textual and policy arguments to the contrary, those same rationales may
essentially bar an avoidance action under § 547 to challenge unreasonable
creditor bid-ins.
However, there is another equally plausible reading of BFP that may
support avoidance of unreasonable creditor bin-ins. In BFP, aside from
protection of title, the Court focused on process. The Court was careful to limit
its holding to situations where applicable state foreclosure process was strictly
followed; therefore, one may readBFP as establishing the proposition that if the
process is fair, it necessarily follows that the value derived as the fruit of the
process is fair. Process is king. The Court will not entertain attacks on the result
of the process if the process is fair. Additionally, what constitutes a fair process,
according to the Court, is a matter of state and federal law.
When this rationale is applied to unreasonable creditor bid-ins, it appears
that a focus on process may condemn such foreclosure sales. In deciding
whether a preferential effect exists under § 547(b)(5), the court compares what
the creditor received through the transfer with what the creditor would have
received in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation if the transfer had not been
made. This hypothetical liquidation case is itself a fair process by which a fair
value is determined. If the creditor receives more than fair value, that is, more
than under the hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, then the transfer should be
subject to avoidance. Thus, BFPmay promote, not hinder, certain attacks on real
property foreclosures.
VI. CONCLUSION
Real property foreclosures under the Bankruptcy Code pose a viperous nest
of complex conceptual problems. Under BFP the Supreme Court insulated
regularly conducted, noncollusive real property foreclosure sales from attack
269. Id. at 544 (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 60 (1911)).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 544-45 n.8 (emphasis omitted).
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under § 548 as a constructively fraudulent transfer. The Court accomplished this
result by holding that the bid price received at foreclosure sales constitutes
reasonably equivalent value as a matter of law, if the sale is a regularly
conducted, non-collusive foreclosure sale. However, this decision did not
address a trustee's attack on a real property foreclosure sale under § 547 as an
avoidable preference. Although authorities disagree on the issue of whether a
real property foreclosure sale constitutes an avoidable preference where the
creditor is the winning bidder and substantial debtor equity is lost by the estate,
RFP may suggest that any new attacks should be rejected as inconsistent with
the protection of title notions so strong a part of real property law. However, this
suggestion is inconsistent with the language of § 547(b) and with the policies
embodied in the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, the more compelling argument
would show that unreasonable creditor bid-ins should be subject to challenge
under § 547.
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